

Dr. George W. Norlin Outlines Duties of State University to Its Students and the State

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HERE is a general feeling that the walls are closing in on freedom of expression everywhere. In many countries abroad it is anathema, and in our own country there are disturbing symptoms. Therefore, it may be well for us who wish to guard universities as citadels of freedom to define as exactly as we can just what we are defending.

For freedom is not an absolute but a relative privilege, and the abuse of it may discredit and destroy the very thing which we wish to preserve and promote.

These comments are not made particularly with reference to anything here and now, but are prompted by more than half a century of experience in colleges and universities here and abroad, as student, teacher and executive.

What is "academic freedom"? Has it any bounds? Is it, like any other kind of freedom, something which can exist only by setting limits to it?

It is, I suppose, well known that originally the term contained only the idea of the freedom of the university as an independent corporation—freedom from outside control.

That idea seems not to enter the discussion of academic freedom today. It is brushed aside as if it were of historical interest only. Yet it is today a very live issue. There has been for some years now a general movement in the direction of centering the financial control of state institutions of higher learning in the capitol building. In our own state all other such institutions have been for some time under such control, the university being as yet exempted from it by the protection of the state constitution. In the long run this means political control and, therefore, relates itself to academic freedom within the institution.

The idea of academic freedom as it is now conceived and discussed is a modern birth. We borrowed the idea and the term from German universities, where the principle of *Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit* won its way until

its complete collapse six years ago.

We borrowed the principle, but not the whole principle. We have not paid much attention to the freedom of the learner, *Lernfreiheit*. In fact, the teacher has been free to place all manner of compulsions and paternalism upon the student. This fact invites extended discussion and consideration, but I shall not attempt to go into it here save to say that a university made up of opposing camps, each clamoring for freedom for itself, is not a place where any freedom will bear good fruit. As I have said elsewhere again and again, a university in the truest sense represents a fellowship, a companionship, a partnership, of faculty and student body—of older and younger students—all working together in their common business. If this ideal be held constantly in mind as the objective to be striven towards, freedom will cease to be a matter of contention.

It is the purpose of this paper to discuss "academic freedom" of the teacher and of the researcher. This has meant, both in theory and practice, the freedom of the competent professor to be undisturbed in speaking the truth as he sees it to his students on the campus in the domain of learning which is his particular province and in publishing the results of his investigations and researches in journals and books.

But the term academic freedom in our country is being broadened to include the freedom of the citizen at large in a de-

mocracy which guarantees the freedom of the spoken and the written word within very vague boundaries of decency and decorum.

But is the freedom of the professor and of the citizen at large one and the same thing? The citizen at large is free to express himself as a partisan, a propagandist, a fanatic, a soapbox orator, even a rabble rouser. Has the professor the same freedom? The question answers itself.

A member of a university faculty speaks and writes under the aegis of the university. He wears its mantle and cannot put it off. He carries a prestige and influence and, therefore, a responsibility which the citizen at large does not have—the responsibility of being truly representative of the university.

But what does it mean to be truly representative of the university? Does the university stand for a creed? It may be shocking to answer that it does. The medieval university stood for a creed. The German and Italian universities stand for a creed; indeed, they are engaged in the propagation of lies, believing that lies point the way of salvation. The American university stands for a different kind of creed, tho it is a creed nevertheless. But let us not call it a creed. Let us rather call it a FAITH.

"Let us follow the argument (LOGOS—reason, truth) wherever it leads," said Plato, meaning that it is the highest function of man to pursue the truth, whether it leads into pleasant or

unpleasant places. No one can prove that this is a good thing to do. We can only assume, we can only have faith, that this is a good thing to do—that while it is manifest that the truth often offends and hurts for a time, yet we best show our worth as rational beings by seeking the truth, looking it sincerely and courageously in the face and acting upon it as our MAIN CHANCE. "The truth shall make you free."

Truth

Is That Which a University Is Seeking.

That is the faith for which the American university stands, and, let us pray, will continue to stand. The university is an instrument, not of propaganda, but of SCIENCE in the broadest meaning of that term. When anyone is considered for appointment to a university faculty, the first question that is commonly asked about him, and the first question that should always be asked, is this: Is he a scientist (a scholar) who "knows his stuff," and is he capable of presenting what he knows honestly, courageously and without prejudice?

When I use the words "without prejudice" I am not thinking of the professor who sets forth naked facts or pros and cons, defying his students to guess what his own feelings are. Facts are dead bones unless clothed with the flesh of interpretation. I am thinking of the teacher who is "valiant for truth"—who betrays a passionate devotion to the truth as he sees it, who is a PERSONALITY rather than a depersonalized mechanism, but who is tolerant and fair and SCIENTIFIC. If the professor has enthusiasm, let him show it. His students may not be carried away by his enthusiasm, but if it be the enthusiasm of the scholar and not of the smasher (the icon-

oclast) they will respect him and love him and they will get from him the stuff out of which attitudes of mind and character are made.

If what I have said is reasonable, then it follows that being a scientist (a scholar) means being a liberal. I mean liberal in the true sense of that word. The crimes which are now committed in the name of liberalism have been adequately set forth by Eugene Lyons in the April issue of the *American Mercury*, and I shall not discuss them here. He is no liberal who wants freedom for himself which he does not willingly concede to others. He is no liberal who feels that the truth is locked up in his own brain and who shuts his ears to conflicting opinions. Truth is not always, perhaps never, an absolute. Often, especially in controversial fields, it is so elusive that no one can reasonably feel that he holds it in his clutch.

Liberalism means a willingness to give a hearing to every side. It means tolerance of opposing views among men and women who doubt whether they have all of the truth in their possession. Without liberalism there is no proper university.

So much for academic freedom on the campus. What is a professor's duty and responsibility (let us not speak of rights) off the campus? Should he deny himself freedom of expression on the questions that agitate the society, the state or the nation in which he lives? Hardly anyone will answer with an absolute yes.

Now this last point of view seems and, in the abstract is, very reasonable. A faculty might theoretically be so indiscreet as to weaken the power of the university to give further scope to their indiscretions, or, to put it less brashly, might to such a degree discredit the university in the eyes of those who support it as to devitalize the very academic freedom for which the university stands. But to say that no one

should so speak and write as to injure the university is to set up a dangerous standard. Anyone who speaks out positively and forthrightly steps on somebody's toes. I myself have been criticized for speaking out in a manner to offend many people who passionately hold to opposite views. Perhaps the criticism has in it some degree of justice.

University

Must Assist State in Its Problems.

A university president has put upon him restraints which are not felt by others of the staff. It is his business to build up good will for the university so that the university may have the means to vitalize and energize its work. Because of this he seems sometimes to be unsympathetic to those who think of academic freedom as if they lived in a vacuum. The opposition which exists on many a campus where the faculty seems to look upon the administration as its natural enemy is in most cases groundless.

The president is often more concerned with guarding and promoting academic freedom than are his colleagues of the faculty. Were the faculty charged with the responsibility of administering the university and seeing it, not as an isolated, independent corporation, but as part and parcel of the social order, the problem of protecting and promoting academic freedom by setting proper limits to it would, I think, be rather simple.

I have recently read an interesting pamphlet issued by the University of Wisconsin which sets forth the ideals and practices of that university as an institution whose campus extends to the boundaries of the state, as if it were in this regard distinctive. But every state university ought to be distinctive in that sense.

The University of Colorado owes an obligation of service to the state that is broader than the service which we give to students on the campus. More and more of university research should be given to problems of the state. The university should be a recognized center for the dissemination of true information to the people of the state on questions and problems that touch the public welfare. This should go without saying, but in fact the people of the state have not learned to use the university for that purpose. Nor are our own friends who have most at heart the welfare of the university convinced that such a service should be given by the university—except in matters about which there is no difference of opinion.

The legislature, as I wrote these words, had before it a scheme for a radical reorganization of state administration, which was set up by an outside commercial firm of so-called experts, paid largely from private funds, which proceeded without knowledge of the state's background of experience, and which in some respects has arrived at conclusions in vacuo.

I am radical enough to hope that the state will in time turn to the university for such services and that the university will be authorized and empowered to perform them.

Our ears are filled these days with complaints of the failures of democracy. I wonder if we realize how much these failures are due to the great difficulty experienced by the voter in getting true information on which to base well considered judgments. His ears are deafened by a thousand tongues of propaganda—political campaigners who seek, not truth, but office, special interests with selfish axes to grind, other publicity agencies whose primary objective is dividends. Is it any wonder that John Citizen is confused? Where is he to get true

information? Where is truth to be found?

In the midst of this confusion stands the state university. It has no axes to grind. It is not partisan. It is not commercial. It is an agency of truth. It seeks its dividends in human welfare alone. Are not the people to use it as such? And should it not welcome being used as such?

By being such it will always offend some. There will always be some to tell us to mind our own business. But what is our business? What is the business of the professor? It is not his business to keep his mouth shut when he can speak with knowledge and authority.

But let it be understood that in a sense he speaks from his "chair" and not from a soap box. The loose-tongued who seeks, not the truth, but the front page puts all his colleagues on the defensive and undermines the very liberty for which he clamors. The professor is in his place on the campus and off it, he is within his rights, and he is true to his responsibility, when he expresses himself as a scientist, as a true representative of the spirit of the university. If he does that he should be able to command the respect even of those who do not agree with him, but even if he does offend he will in the long run reflect credit upon the university and add to its influence.

I do not know how to set more definite bounds to academic freedom. It may be that the vague definition I have tried to express is too definite.

I am inclined to think that you cannot have any kind of freedom without risking occasional abuses of it. Perhaps the good, as Aristotle held, lies somewhere between extremes. I think that excesses can best be avoided by the sober influence of one's colleagues of the faculty, especially if the faculty will be less human than most of us are and think more of their responsibilities than of their rights.

...TROUBLE, IT IS NOT A GARMENT IN WHICH TO WORK.
 Whatever the motive, the result of these efforts is all too apparent; after six years of strict regulation and taxation of industry, we have as many people unemployed as at the beginning of the period. That is the grim and incapable fact.

What Can Easily Be Done.

When industry has a chance to make profit it expands and employs more men; when unprofitable, it reduces employment and curtails its operations.
 Fortunately, with a little will—even a little goodwill—we can remove all of those artificial barriers to profit making without too much difficulty; and we can do this without letting any of the economic reforms of the few years.

Three conditions are primarily responsible for the extraordinary economic achievements of the American people.

We were, of course, lucky in coming to a land where the natural resources were abundant.

We were even luckier to come to it at such a time and under such circumstances that it could be developed as a whole, before it was chopped up into small competing territories as in Europe.

Economic Freedom a Vital Need.

This meant that we were not only rich in natural materials, but blessed with the greatest free-trade area in the world.

Under these physical conditions our forefathers understood what might be called a spiritual one: a faith in individual initiative and free enterprise. When our forefathers said "freedom," they did not mean simply freedom of speech, freedom of press, or freedom of religion.

THEY MEANT ECONOMIC FREEDOM AS WELL. THEY WERE STRONG BELIEVERS IN THE DESIRABILITY OF ENCOURAGING BUSINESS ENTERPRISE.

This item of economic freedom has not been maintained sufficiently large in the dossier on liberty maintained by the professional apostles. Fainted, perhaps, with that slight social inferiority which, as mentioned, seems to attach to the word "profits," economic freedom has been standing than its intellectual and moral

PRESSION OF CIVIL FREEDOM.

Presumably our forefathers were aware of this interdependence of liberties. Certainly they seemed to recognize the necessity of enlarging their territory except in respect to

BRITISH PEER APPEALS FOR NEW APPROACH TOWARD GERMANY

(By Ralph W. Barnes.)

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London.

AS GREAT BRITAIN, disillusioned with "appeasement" and arming to the teeth, swings toward a frame of mind equivalent to that epitomized in the warring slogan, "Hang the Kaiser," what amounts to an "appeal to reason" is issued by Sir Arthur Salter who, at the height of the economic depression seven years ago, made a profound impression with his book, "Recovery, the Second Effort."

This new "appeal" is a plea against hate and condemnation of a whole people—the German people—and for a "second effort" despite formidable obstacles, at a "general settlement" and the erection of a revised security system.

Not that Sir Arthur calls for a return to "appeasement." On the contrary, he suggests by implication that this phrase as used to define the policy pursued until a few weeks ago by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, was hardly more than a "euphemism for opportunistic surrender." He insists that there must be "no more surrenders under menace."



Sir Arthur Salter.

Moreover, Sir Arthur criticizes the Chamberlain government for its procrastination in the past in mobilizing the resources of the country for possible war, demands the establishment of a national government, representing all parties—or in lieu of that a sort of all-party "committee of public safety"—and urges energetic measures to combine with other powers in the face of a common danger.

expand its territory except in respect to race and Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein and a few inferior colonies. It was an industrial expansion in a confined area, the eastern part

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But for him such a far-reaching emergency policy—the essential—is not enough. The British government, he says, should do nothing less than issue a "manifesto" declaring its "peace aims and war aims" as a means of "opening the way to a settlement."

Sir Arthur provides for the consideration of Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues a detailed "draft manifesto" which, altho it is not presented in point-to-point form, recalls President Wilson's famous fourteen points.

Rights and Needs of Germans.

Commenting on this novel project, the New Statesman and Nation writes that "the character of the present rulers of Germany should not prevent us from publishing 'peace terms' before a war instead of after it—especially since their publication might help to avert it."

In the "manifesto" program a highly liberal view is taken of the rights and needs of the German nation, the not, of course, of some of Chancellor Adolf Hitler's grandiose aims.

Countering in advance the charge of Utopianism, Sir Arthur recognizes that a declaration of that type issued by the British government might be given short shrift by Der

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At the end of the century, Harlan was just a crossroads named Mount Pleasant. The population of the county was less than 10,000. It was a pauper county, moreover, one into which the state paid more than it took out in taxes.

There was no railroad. Money was virtually unknown. There was a small logging industry, but the descendants of the early settlers lived primarily by agriculture. The mountainsides are steep and often rocky. Farming is not an easy life in Harlan county. Barter was the principal form of exchange.

Nicknamed "Bloody Harlan."

In 1904, Mount Pleasant was renamed Harlan. A few years later rich seams of soft coal were discovered. The Louisville & Nashville ran a railroad into the county in 1910 so that the coal could be moved out. The big expansion of mining, as an industry in Harlan county, came during the World War years. The county climbed out of the pauper class in that period.

The population of the county multiplied six or seven times. Today it is almost 70,000. Mountaineers and farmers from North Carolina, Virginia and Tennessee moved into the county with their families. Altho many of these newcomers were rated as "furriners" by the old Harlan families, there was no great influx of immigrant miners, such as there was in the western Pennsylvania coal fields.

The limited picket lines that the National Guards have been permitting the striking miners are staffed almost entirely by men of

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FINGERS TELL—Mrs. Minnie Clouse, widow of a coal miner, holds up both hands in telling Willard Hubbard she was left a widow with ten children as a result of strife in the Harlan coal fields.—Associated Press Wirephoto.

ROOSEVELT AND KING TO MEET PRIVATELY AT CAPITAL

(By Joseph Driscoll.)

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Washington.

THE British ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, has let it be known that King George VI when he visits Washington with Queen Elizabeth next month is likely to have some private talks with both President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull.

It would be interesting to know the trend of those conversations, but not much is expected to leak out except in a very general way.

It can be taken for granted that the king is not coming thousands of miles merely to talk about the weather altho Washington's heat

and humidity are really something to talk about. Since, as Mark Twain pointed out, nothing is ever done about the weather anyway, practical men such as the king, the president and the secretary of state doubtless will skip the weather topic to discuss something capable of improvement, say Anglo-American friendship, understanding, co-operation and "parallel action" in peace or war time.

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